What you get
| Capability | Status |
|---|---|
| End-to-end posture scans across AWS / Azure / GCP / OCI / Kubernetes | Live — subprocess scanner, OCSF findings, dedup on re-scan |
| IAM graph (principals, policies, attachments, trust edges, resource grants) | Live — collected on every scan, queryable per asset |
| Schedule-based scans | Live — per-account cadence (6 h min, 24 h default) or cron expression |
| Manual “Run now” | Live — UI button on each schedule row |
| Unified findings inbox | Live — severity / status / framework filters, group-by, mute/resolve workflow |
| Compliance framework tags on findings | Live — refs stored on every finding |
| Compliance scoring per framework | Live — severity-weighted score per framework, per account, rolled up |
| Attack-path traversal | Live — lateral chains starting from each high-impact finding |
| MITRE ATT&CK matrix · Threat map | Live — tactic / technique heatmap and world-map projection |
Provider coverage
| Provider | Connect auth | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AWS | Role ARN + external ID (STS assume-role), or access key + secret (+ optional session token); default region | Posture scans + IAM exposure graph |
| Azure | Service principal — subscription ID, tenant ID, client ID, client secret | Posture scans + IAM exposure graph |
| GCP | Service-account JSON + project ID (optional region scope) | Posture scans + IAM exposure graph |
| OCI | Tenancy OCID, user OCID, fingerprint, private key (PEM), region | Posture scans |
| Kubernetes | Onboarded through KSPM’s in-cluster agent, not this page | Posture scans (see KSPM surfaces below) |
| M365 · GitHub · Cloudflare · OpenStack · Vercel · MongoDB Atlas · NHN | Per-provider API credentials | Posture scans |
| Alibaba · Google Workspace · DigitalOcean · Linode | Per-provider credentials | Connect + inventory only — no posture checks yet |
Connecting a cloud account
Dashboard → Integrations → Cloud Providers → Add Provider. Pick the provider, fill in the auth fields, and save. Credentials are encrypted at rest (AES-256-CBC) and the connection is mirrored into the account list the scheduler reads from. Use Test on the saved connection to validate the credentials. What each provider needs:| Provider | Form fields |
|---|---|
| AWS | Role ARN + external ID (preferred), or access key ID + secret access key (+ optional session token). Default region required. |
| Azure | Subscription ID, Tenant ID, Client ID, Client Secret (all required). |
| GCP | Project ID + service-account JSON (both required). Optional: regions to scope the scan. |
| OCI | Tenancy OCID, User OCID, Fingerprint, Private key (PEM), Region. |
Triggers
| Trigger | When |
|---|---|
| Schedule | Default cadence per account — configurable from 6 h (minimum) to 7 d. Default: 24 h. Cron expressions also supported. |
| Manual | Dashboard → Cloud Security → Schedules → Run now. Sets next_run_at = NOW(); the scheduler picks it up on the next tick. |
Dashboard surfaces
| Page | What it shows |
|---|---|
| Overview | Risk dial, by-severity donut, top failing checks, account fleet status |
| Findings | Unified inbox; group by check / provider / account / region / severity / resource type / service |
| Assets | Every cloud resource discovered, with finding rollup. Group by provider / risk level / resource type / service |
| Asset detail | Per-asset findings, IAM exposure neighborhood, software inventory |
| Schedules | Per-account cadence, last run, next run, manual Run now button |
| Scans | Scan history + filters |
| Scan detail | Per-scan metadata + timeline |
| Compliance | Per-framework severity-weighted score, control drill-down, per-control evidence |
| Attack Paths | Lateral chains starting from each high-impact finding |
| MITRE Matrix | Detection density by ATT&CK tactic + technique |
| Threat Map | Findings projected onto cloud regions on a world map |
| KSPM Overview / Cluster detail | Kubernetes posture rollup + per-cluster findings |
IAM exposure
For any cloud asset (AWS / Azure / GCP), the Asset detail → IAM exposure panel walks the IAM graph in real time:- Principals with access to this resource (direct attachments + group / role chains)
- Policies granting that access, with the effective action set
- Trust edges that let one role assume another
- Resource grants flipped the other way — “what can this principal reach?”