Check ID:
Provider: Kubernetes
Service:
Severity: HIGH
Categories:
Resource type:
rbac_minimize_service_account_token_creationProvider: Kubernetes
Service:
rbacSeverity: HIGH
Categories:
identity-access, cluster-securityResource type:
ClusterRoleBindingWhat this check verifies
Cluster-wide RBAC identifies users or groups grantedcreate on serviceaccounts/token via ClusterRoles/ClusterRoleBindings.
Highlights principals allowed to mint service account tokens through the TokenRequest subresource.
Risk
Ability to mint service account tokens lets users assume those accounts’ API rights, bypassing intended boundaries. This enables privilege escalation, persistent access, and lateral movement, threatening confidentiality and integrity of cluster resources.Recommendation
Enforce least privilege: avoid grantingcreate on serviceaccounts/token to human users or broad groups. Restrict to trusted controllers and scope narrowly with namespaced Role/RoleBinding.
Apply separation of duties, periodic RBAC reviews, and defense in depth to limit token issuance.
Remediation
- CLI
- Dashboard steps
kubectl delete clusterrolebinding <example_resource_name>
References
Where this check fires
This check runs on every scheduled scan against your Kubernetes account. Findings appear at Cloud Security → Findings filterable byCheck ID = rbac_minimize_service_account_token_creation. To re-evaluate after a fix, hit Run now on the account’s schedule under Cloud Security → Schedules — the next scan re-checks this control and marks the finding fixed or keeps it persistent.
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