Check ID:
Provider: AWS
Service:
Severity: LOW
Categories:
Resource type:
iam_check_saml_providers_stsProvider: AWS
Service:
iamSeverity: LOW
Categories:
identity-accessResource type:
OtherWhat this check verifies
IAM SAML providers enable federated role assumption via STSAssumeRoleWithSAML.
This evaluates whether such providers exist in the account.
Risk
Without SAML federation, users rely on long-lived IAM keys. Compromised keys enable persistent API access, causing data exfiltration (C), unauthorized resource or policy changes (I), and difficult revocation. Lack of IdP controls (e.g., MFA, session limits) weakens accountability and access governance.Recommendation
Adopt SAML federation to issue short-lived STS credentials. Map users to roles with least privilege, enforce MFA at the IdP, and set conservative session durations. Retire IAM user access keys for interactive use and monitor role sessions as defense in depth. If federation isn’t possible, tightly scope, rotate, and audit keys.Remediation
- CLI
- Terraform
- Native IaC
- Dashboard steps
aws iam create-saml-provider —name <SAML_PROVIDER_NAME> —saml-metadata-document file://<SAML_METADATA_XML_FILE>
References
Where this check fires
This check runs on every scheduled scan against your AWS account. Findings appear at Cloud Security → Findings filterable byCheck ID = iam_check_saml_providers_sts. To re-evaluate after a fix, hit Run now on the account’s schedule under Cloud Security → Schedules — the next scan re-checks this control and marks the finding fixed or keeps it persistent.
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